Recent studies report significant cross-national variation in the conceptual distinctions or "symbolic boundaries" used by majority groups to construct notions of "us" and "them. " 
INTRODUCTION
A lthough the boundaries of countries neatly divide people into social groups, the conceptual distinctions used to construct notions of "us" and "them" are an equally important component of social identities (Barth 1969; Douglas 1966; Jenkins 1996) . Explaining crossnational variation in the relative salience of these "symbolic boundaries" is the central goal of the boundary-work literature (e.g., Kastoryano 2002; Lamont and Molnár 2002; Wimmer 2005 ). This literature shows that social identities are not only multidimensional but also highly mutable. While religion is an extremely salient symbolic boundary in certain countries, it is largely irrelevant in others and displaced by race, language, or culture-in different configurations-still elsewhere (e.g., Lentin 2004; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka 1994) . Although a number of idiosyncratic explanations have been provided for such variation, they have yet to be synthesized into a theory of boundary-work. Building on previous small-scale comparative studies, this article advances the study of boundary-work by providing the first panorama of symbolic boundaries toward immigrants in 21 European countries.
Immigration is of natural interest to scholars of boundary-work because it reveals the symbolic boundaries deployed when social bound-aries are crossed. While Europeans once looked askance at the U.S. "color line," a recent influx of non-Western immigrants has brought tensions to the fore. The murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the fatal beating of a Chinese student in Ireland in 2002 , and the perennial debate over laïcité (secularism) in France exemplify the severity and variety of such tensions. Today, Europe is perhaps best described as a set of "diverse diversities," not only because of variation in the ethnic and cultural background of minority populations across countries, but also due to variation in their understanding of diversity itself. Britain, for example, practices multicultural race relations (Favell 2001) , whereas the use of racial categories is prohibited under the tenets of répub-licanisme in France (Weil 2002) . Until recently, nationhood in Germany was cast in terms of ancestry (Kastoryano 2002) , while thousands of ex-patriots are denied cultural and legal membership in Greece each year (Kiprianos, Balias, and Passas 2003) . So-called "Dutch tolerance" rests on religious accommodation (Rath et al. 2001 ), but Swedish multiculturalism has a distinctly secular heritage (Runbolm 1994) .
These "philosophies of integration" (Favell 2001 ) are central to the "xenophobophelia" (Stolcke 1995) of European policy makers wary of being compared with the "race-obsessed" United States. It is yet to be determined, however, whether these distinctions also shape the configuration of symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public. This question is central to numerous comparisons of "old" immigration countries in Western Europe (e.g., France, Germany, and Britain) where immigration began in the immediate postwar period (e.g., Brubaker 1992; Favell 2001; Kastoryano 2002 ). In contrast, the emerging literature on the "new" immigration countries of Southern and Eastern Europe emphasizes the absence of philosophies of integration among these regimes (e.g., Lentin 2004; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka 1994) . Because these small-scale comparisons are compartmentalized by region, only idiosyncratic explanations for the configuration of symbolic boundaries have been produced. Macro-level comparisons within and between regions of Europe are needed not only to contextualize previous research, but also to explore significant variation in the historical, demographic, socioeconomic, and institutional characteristics of immigrants and immigration regimes across the Continent.
I begin by developing a framework for the study of boundary-work at the macro level and providing a brief overview of immigration to Europe from 1945 to 2003. I then review the literature on symbolic boundaries in three regions of Europe, highlighting macro-level factors within and between regions. Next, I develop a typology of symbolic boundary configurations by applying a combination of "fuzzy-set" techniques to data derived from questions about a hypothetical immigrant in the 2003 European Social Survey. The results indicate that the symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public do not correspond to the official philosophies of integration emphasized in the literature. Moreover, the data suggest previous comparisons have focused too heavily on Western Europe, overlooking variation across other regions where immigration began more recently. I develop hypotheses to explain this newfound variation using demographic, socioeconomic, institutional, and historical data from a variety of quantitative and qualitative sources. The discussion and conclusion offer examples of how these hypotheses can be combined by future studies toward a theory of boundary-work.
SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES
The recent "boom in boundary studies" (Wimmer 2005) highlights the significance of social classification across a wide variety of contexts. These studies show considerable variation in the "boundaries" developed by groups to separate themselves from others (Abbott 1995; Barth 1969; Bauböck and Rundell 1998; Douglas 1966; Jenkins 1996) . Boundaries have both social and symbolic dimensions; this article examines the latter. Symbolic boundaries are "conceptual distinctions made by social actors .|.|.
[that] separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership." Conversely, "social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to an unequal distribution of resources .|.|. and social opportunities" (Lamont and Molnár 2002:168) . To be sure, symbolic and social boundaries are closely related. While social boundaries are institutionalized, however, symbolic boundaries shift through classification struggles where majority groups attempt to maintain the privileges attached to their status (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003) . "Only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon can they take on a constraining character .|.|. [and] .|.|. become social boundaries" (Lamont and Molnár 2002:168) . Citizenship laws, for example, are rigid social boundaries, but they are predicated on the flexible distinctions of symbolic boundaries, which are needed to define such exclusion (Bryson 2006; Sackmann, Peters, and Faist 2003) . In this way, symbolic boundaries are a "necessary but insufficient" condition for the creation or modification of social boundaries and should therefore be viewed as "equally real" (Lamont 1992) .
To unravel the complex relationship between symbolic and social boundaries, studies of boundary-work emphasize the multidimensionality and mutability of the former. Whereas social psychological theories of social identity require groups be categorized as "in-groups" or "out-groups" (e.g., Tajfel 1981) , the boundarywork approach I propose requires attention to the relative salience or configuration of multiple symbolic boundaries (e.g., race, religion, language, culture, or human capital). This not only adds much-needed precision to the concept of social identity but also enables one to ask whether the configuration of symbolic boundaries reveals the interests of groups in competition for social resources. For example, previous research suggests symbolic boundaries based on race-increasingly stigmatized through the growth of international antiracist discoursehave been displaced by religion, language, culture, or even human capital (Goldberg 2006; Lamont 2000) . By examining the entire configuration of symbolic boundaries, one can identify how the social boundaries previously protected by race are renegotiated. In this way, the boundary-work literature attempts to explain why majority groups choose certain symbolic boundaries, incorporating some groups while excluding others. The manner in which symbolic boundaries are policed or made permeable reveals the strategic-although often subconscious-interests of majority groups.
BACKGROUND: IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE 1945 TO 2003
The comparative study of immigration in Europe is ideally suited to the study of boundary work, given major differences in the causes, sources, and scope of interaction between immigrants and natives across countries. Although a comprehensive overview of such variation is not feasible here, four major axes of differentiation can be identified: (1) sources and timing of migration, (2) the size and origin of immigrant groups and their position in the labor market, (3) citizenship and civic inclusion policies, and (4) philosophies of integration.
TIMING AND SOURCES OF MIGRATION
As After 1970, European integration and economic restructuring altered the sources and timing of immigration flows (Brochmann 1996) . Although postwar labor migration bolstered the economies of many Western European countries, global economic decline in the 1970s led many to tighten their borders. Large-scale immigration continued, however, through familyreunification policies. By the mid-1980s, countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands had significant second-generation immigrant populations. Meanwhile, Southern European countries began to experience substantial immigration from Latin America, North Africa, and Eastern Europe for the first time. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and civil unrest in Africa and the Middle East ushered in a new wave of refugee migration in the mid-1990s. At the same time, illegal migration of nonEuropean Union (non-EU) immigrants increased while legal obstacles preventing intraEuropean Union migration began to dissolve.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOREIGN-BORN TODAY
Variation in the timing and sources of postwar migration to Europe caused vast discrepancies in the size and regional origin of immigration populations. (jus sanguinis) were treated as foreigners regardless of their birthplace (Alba 2005; Brubaker 1992 ). The distinction between these "civic" and "ethnic" citizenship regimes has been applied throughout Europe (Weldon 2006) , although it is heavily criticized for failing to capture the nuances within each category (Kuzio 2002; Kymlicka 1999 Table 4 ). Most philosophies of integration draw upon the legacy of nation building or colonial strategy. For example, French républicanisme stresses total assimilation of immigrants, while British multicultural race relations follows a pluralist model loosely based upon a similar colonial policy. Until 2000, Germany's Ausländerpolitik (foreigner's policy) treated immigrants and their children as "permanent guests" entitled to very few benefits from the state. Many Southern and Eastern European countries either do not have philosophies of integration or are in the process of developing them (Carrera 2006). Those countries currently developing philosophies of integration are responding to increasing calls within the EU to design a "Common Agenda for Integration" among all member states whereby immigrants obtain "basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions" (European Parliament 2005).
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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

WESTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE
While race is central to discussions of symbolic boundaries in the United States, its relevance is highly contested in Western Europe, where race is not defined through hypodescent but rather through nation building, colonialism, and the Holocaust. Analyses of racism in Western Europe often focus on the relationship between philosophies of integration and public attitudes. For example, Favell (2001:226) emphasizes the "colorblind" ethic of républicanisme in France vis-à-vis multicultural race relations in Britain: "In France, racism is public and spectacular; .|.|. in Britain .|.|. it has become privatized and unspoken." Still others suggest that "private" racism is equally prominent in France, albeit disguised as républicanisme (Lapeyronnie 1993; Todd 1994; Wieviorka et al. 1992) . Comparative historical studies of France and Germany suggest race became part of national identity through conflict between the two nations, long before the arrival of non-Western immigrants (Brubaker 1992; Weil 2002) . Another strand of the literature compares the emergence of antiracist attitudes (Lentin 2004; Taguieff 1991) and shows a more general denunciation of race throughout Western Europe. Given the widespread stigmatization of racism in Western Europe, religion has become a primary focus of the boundary-work literature in this region (Zolberg and Long 1999) . For example, Goldberg (2006:349) argues that World War II created a "shift in Europe's dominant fixation of concern and resentment from the figure of 'the black' .|.|. to that of 'the Muslim.'" Again, however, the literature shows important cross-national variation in the relative salience of religion in the configuration of symbolic boundaries. Kastoryano (2004) argues that anti-Muslim attitudes are more public in France than in Germany because secularism is an integral aspect of Civic Republicanism, whereas German secularism allows religious pluralism. While the French openly demand the "nationalization" of Islam, she argues, Germans are more likely to view Muslims as Gastarbeiter (guest workers) whose cultural differences are to be tolerated but not incorporated. Comparing anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Britain, Rath and colleagues (2001) suggest the legacy of "pillarisation," or religious accommodation, has encouraged religious tolerance in the former countries, whereas the highly political Muslim community in Britain has provoked public backlash. Not unlike racism, however, there is evidence that overt "Islamophobia" has become stigmatized in many Western countries as well (Cesari and McLoughlin 2005; Kastoryano 2002) .
Previous studies also suggest that language and culture are two of the most important symbolic boundaries in Western European countries. Again, the literature focuses on the centrality of language and culture in philosophies of integration. In France, for example, government demands that immigrants learn the language and culture through le creuset français (the French Melting Pot) provoked a public backlash that stressed la droit à la difference (the right to be different) (Todd 1994) . More recently, Brubaker (2001) identified a strong resurgence of assimilationist rhetoric spurred by the success of the far right in France. Similar, although perhaps less virulent, debates about assimilation have emerged in Britain (Bleich 2003; Favell 2001) and Germany (Kastoryano 2002) .
The question of assimilation is fiercely contested in France, Britain, and Germany, but the debate is less prominent among noncolonial powers where assimilation has no historical precedent (Garner 2003; Wimmer 2002; Zølner 2000) . Zølner (2000) argues that Danes use the principle of Grundtvigianism or "bounded equality" to distinguish themselves from the colonial atrocities perpetrated by their neighbors. Similar observations have been made of "transethnic" patriotism in Switzerland, which stresses linguistic and cultural pluralism, albeit within strict European limits (Wimmer 2002) .
A final question in the literature on symbolic boundaries in Western Europe concerns the possible convergence of attitudes toward immigrants at the regional level. A number of studies point to growing similarities in the immigration policies of Western European countries now that most face similar challenges of immigrant integration (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2005) . Joppke (2005) , for example, argues that most Western countries have shifted the criteria of citizenship decisions from the characteristics of groups to the credentials and voluntarism of individuals. Such arguments are provoked in part by the growing harmonization of immigration policy at the EU level and an international human rights discourse that stresses civic criteria in citizenship decisions. Although supranational pressures have been shown to produce convergence of government policies, it is not yet clear whether these forces have produced similar effects on public opinion. A number of studies describe an emergent tide of xenophobia based on the notion of "fortress Europe" (e.g., Geddes and Favell 1999; Goldberg 2006; Kastoryano 2002 ), but it is not yet clear which symbolic boundaries are most salient in these developing attitudes. These findings have scarcely been tested empirically, particularly outside Western Europe.
SOUTHERN EUROPE
The literature on boundary-work in Southern Europe highlights the region's abrupt transition from emigration to immigration in recent years. Comparing Greece, Italy, and Spain with the old immigration countries of Western Europe, Triandafyllidou (2001) concludes that symbolic boundaries in Southern European countries are much more unstable. Indeed, previous research suggests ethnicity and culture in Southern Europe have historical antecedents based on the unique "mixed" character of the Mediterranean, marked by North African and Middle Eastern influences long before Western states came into existence. 1 For these reasons, previous studies have concluded that race is less salient in Southern Europe than in Western Europe (Medrano 2005; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka 1994) . For example, Sniderman and colleagues (2000) report no difference in Italians' attitudes toward immigrants from Africa and Eastern Europe. Similarly, previous survey analysis suggests that Greeks are the least likely of all Europeans to describe themselves as racist (Kiprianos et al. 2003) . There is tentative evidence, however, that Western-style racism is being "imported" to Southern Europe via popular culture (Lentin 2004) .
The role of religion in the configuration of symbolic boundaries is also unclear, even though Christianity has historically enjoyed a pivotal place in nationalism in the Mediterranean (Muro and Quiroga 2005) . Only recently has the arrival of non-Christian immigrants provoked scholars to analyze the role of symbolic boundaries based on religion (ZapataBarrero 2003) . There is limited evidence that religion is a more important symbolic boundary in Greece than in Italy (Triandafyllidou 2001) . The relative salience of symbolic boundaries based on language and culture has yet to be studied in detail, although both were strong components of colonial strategies in Spain and Portugal (Medrano 2005; Mendoza 2001 ). Instead, the literature on Southern Europe focuses primarily on perceptions of economic threat induced by the abrupt increase of immigrants in the labor market and high levels of unemployment and illegal migration (Apap 1997; Baganha 1997 ). Sniderman and colleagues (2000) report that Italians have negative attitudes toward immigrants with low human capital. Likewise, Kiprianos and colleagues' (2003) analysis of multiple public opinion surveys suggests that Greeks are among the most likely of all Europeans to blame immigrants for high unemployment. Previous research also suggests human capital is an important symbolic boundary against the large Albanian population in Italy (Vasta 1993) and Greece (Lazaridis and Psimmenos 2000) .
EASTERN EUROPE
Because immigration to Eastern countries began very recently, the literature on symbolic boundaries in Eastern Europe primarily focuses on the ethnic "unmixing" (Brubaker 1996) of people brought together under communism. Complicating these studies is the migration of "national" minorities such as the Roma (Brubaker et al. 2006) . A small but growing literature has begun to compare how these factors shape attitudes toward the rapidly growing population of "new" immigrants from Asia and the Middle East in Eastern Europe (e.g., Nyíri 2003; Phalet and Örkény 2001; Wallace 2002) .
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Several studies conclude that of all Europeans, those in the East are the most hostile toward foreigners (Nyíri 2003; Wallace 2002) . The common assumption is that cultural membership is based on race or ancestry in these countries, although this has been challenged in recent years (Janmaat 2006; Nyíri 2003; Szoke 1992) . Nevertheless, Wallace (2002) reports racism is higher in Eastern Europe than in other regions, even though non-European immigrants make up an extremely small proportion of their total population. There is some evidence of growing racism toward Asian immigrants in the Czech Republic and Hungary (Nyíri 2005) , although negative attitudes are most frequently directed toward African and Middle Eastern immigrants (Nyíri 2003) . Other studies suggest that religion is a more important symbolic boundary in the Czech Republic than in Hungary and Poland (Wallace 2002) . There is also evidence that language is a strong symbolic boundary in Poland (Nowicka 2006) , as is culture in Hungary and the Czech Republic (Nyíri 2003) . Finally, recent studies show that symbolic boundaries based on human capital are particularly strong throughout Eastern Europe (Nyíri 2003; Phalet and Örkény 2001; Wallace 2002) . Table 5 lists comparative studies of symbolic boundaries toward immigrants in Europe in chronological order. This panorama reveals several patterns that have inhibited the progress of the boundary-work literature thus far. First, most studies compare only a handful of countries. This is because many use qualitative methods that are not conducive to broad cross-national comparison. Second, comparisons of Western European countries outnumber comparisons of Southern and Eastern Europe. While comparisons of France, Britain, and Germany are commonplace, the amount of variation between these countries has yet to be assessed in a wider European context. This is important not only because of variation in the development of social boundaries between natives and immigrants within and between regions, but also because it limits assessment of the possible convergence of symbolic boundaries in Western countries themselves. Finally, symbolic boundaries based on race, religion, language, culture, and human capital are analyzed in the literature at large, but most studies focus only on two or three of these dimensions. Insofar as the theory of boundary-work emphasizes the mutability of symbolic boundaries, inattention to the entire configuration risks overlooking symbolic boundaries that displace others. Therefore, the primary goal of this article is to produce a typology of symbolic boundary configurations using data on multiple symbolic boundaries from countries in different regions of Europe.
A PANORAMA OF SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE
The secondary goal of this article is to identify new macro-level variables that can be used to explain the configuration of symbolic boundaries. Although explanations of variation in the configuration of symbolic boundaries routinely cite country-level phenomena, the compartmentalization of the boundary-work literature has prohibited systematic analysis of historical, demographic, socioeconomic, and institutional variation among countries within and between regions. For example, most comparisons of Western European countries focus on citizenship laws and philosophies of integration, but they neglect the demographic and socioeconomic factors emphasized in the literature on Southern and Eastern Europe. Conversely, studies of Southern and Eastern countries often overlook the institutional factors central to the literature on Western Europe. Below I explore the relationship between my typology and the four axes of variation across countries identified above: (1) the sources and timing of immigration, (2) the size and origin of immigrant groups and their position in the labor market, (3) citizenship and civic inclusion policies, and (4) philosophies of integration. 2 In this way, I provide the first systematic analysis of these variables in broad cross-national perspective that can be used by future studies to develop a more comprehensive theory of boundary-work.
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MEASURES OF SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES
Data for this study are from the 2002/2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross-sectional, multistage probability sample of social attitudes among people age 15 and older in 21 European countries. Because this study is designed to probe the configuration of symbolic boundaries deployed by native populations, I drop all first-and second-generation immigrants from the sample. In addition, I exclude all respondents who indicated they are members of an ethnic minority in their country. 3 My total sample comprises 33,258 individuals in 21 countries, averaging 1,584 people per country.
I derive measures of symbolic boundaries from a unique set of questions in the ESS that
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#3285-ASR 73:1 filename:73103-Bail page 47 (2000) Zølner (2000) Brubaker ( (2001) Kastoryano (2002) Wallace (2002) Bleich (2003) Garner (2003) Nyíri (2003) Rydgren ( Responses were coded on a 10-point Likert scale where '0' is "extremely unimportant" and '10' is "extremely important." I refer to the six symbolic boundaries measured in these questions as race, religion, language, culture, education, and occupation.
The "hypothetical immigrant" module of the ESS marks a considerable improvement over previous cross-national surveys of attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. Whereas most previous surveys ask respondents to describe their feelings toward "immigrants," "immigrants from outside Europe," or "racial and ethnic minorities," the ESS questions are designed to capture important variations within each of these broad categories. By disaggregating attitudes toward immigrants into multiple symbolic boundaries that are compared in the boundary-work literature (see Table 5 ), the ESS measures both the intensity and the form of attitudes toward immigrants. It is thus particularly well suited to the configurational approach to symbolic boundaries adopted here. As with all survey-based studies, however, it is possible that ESS respondents produced socially desirable responses to the questions, rather than the intimate convictions that might be revealed through ethnography. This is particularly relevant for the question on race because the literature demonstrates the widespread influence of antiracist discourse in Western Europe. It remains to be determined, however, precisely how much antiracism has permeated each country (Lentin 2004 ) and, more importantly, how such developments have shaped the entire configuration of symbolic boundaries in response. Table 6 presents descriptive characteristics for the six symbolic boundaries in each country. Language and culture are consistently among the most important symbolic boundaries.
Conversely, race is least important in all countries, although in varying degrees. In Luxembourg, for example, the mean score for racial symbolic boundaries is .93, but it is 4.12 in Hungary. Religion is relatively more salient, averaging 3.52 across all countries and ranging as high as 5.87 in Greece. Symbolic boundaries based on human capital (education and occupation) generally fall between the most important (language and culture) and the least important (race and religion) symbolic boundaries.
FUZZY-SET METHODOLOGY
Typologies are analytical tools used to compare cases-in this case, countries-with ideal types not observed empirically. In practice, however, many of the quantitative methods used to construct typologies create mutually exclusive groups, ignoring the likelihood that many countries are in fact combinations of multiple types (Ragin 2000) . Traditional or "crisp" cluster analysis, for example, ignores countries "in between" types by forcing them into the clusters they most closely resemble. Although this is inconsequential for studies with large sample sizes, failure to identify such cases among the 21 countries in this study risks misidentification and misinterpretation of typical symbolic boundary configurations. I address these issues below through a combination of "fuzzy-set" techniques. I use "fuzzy cluster analysis" (FCA) (Dimitriadou et al. 2006 ) to produce a typology of symbolic boundary configurations and explore its relationship to the country-level factors above using measures of "fuzzy consistency" (Ragin 2006) . 4 Crisp cluster analysis requires that countries belong to one-and only one-group. In contrast, FCA assigns countries "membership scores" that describe how much they resemble multiple fuzzy clusters or "sets." This is accomplished by applying a "fuzzy modifier" to the traditional c-means clustering algorithm (Dimitriadou et al. 2006) . Consider the matrix X ij comprised of 21 countries (i) and their mean scores for the six symbolic boundaries above
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where ui j is the membership coefficient of country i in set j, and d ij is the Euclidean distance between observation i and center j. The researcher must specify a value greater than 1 for k and m, the fuzziness index. 6 The function is constrained such that each country's membership cannot be negative, and the total membership across all sets is normalized. The strength of membership scores increases from 0 to 1, and the sum of each country's membership scores equals 1. Unlike factor scores, FCA membership scores describe relationships between cases, not variables. Therefore, countries with strong membership in a given set are prototypical, whereas those with weak membership in all sets are simply atypical. The characteristics of each set are identified through inspection of the cluster centroids. A country's membership scores describe how closely its configuration of symbolic boundaries resembles the configuration of cluster centroids in each set. By plotting member-
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ship scores in multidimensional space, one can assess how exclusive each set is. Moreover, one can easily identify countries in between sets as well. The "crisp" clustering solution can be deduced for reference simply by grouping countries according to their strongest membership. The range of membership scores within each crisp set, as well as the amount of overlap between them, reveals the integrity of the crisp clustering solution. In most applications, there is considerable variation within and between crisp clusters. In most cases, FCA therefore provides more precise measures of structure in data than does crisp cluster analysis. Fuzzy sets cannot be analyzed in tandem with non-fuzzy variables unless the latter are transformed into fuzzy sets as well. I calibrate the country-level variables presented in the background sections into fuzzy sets using the method proposed by Ragin (forthcoming) and detailed in the Online Supplement. Even after all variables are transformed into fuzzy sets, standard correlational techniques cannot be used to explore the relationship between fuzzy sets (Ragin 2006) . This is because correlations describe the covariation of variables, whereas the fuzzy-set approach asks whether cases are subsets of one another. Consider Figure 1 , which describes the relationship between two fuzzy sets: X and Y. The figure shows that membership in X is almost always greater than membership in Y. Traditional correlational techniques, however, would not reveal a significant correlation between the two because the points in the lower right-hand corner are considered error. In the fuzzy approach, however, a consistent subset relationship exists between X and Y; meaning that membership in X is almost always a necessary condition for Y. 7 The points in the lower right-hand corner are simply considered cases in which membership in Y must be explained through additional pathways other than X.
As Ragin (2006) shows, the consistency with which one set is a necessary condition for another can be calculated as follows:
This formula measures not only the frequency of X being greater than Y, but also the magnitude of this difference. Large inconsistencies are penalized, but "near misses" are also acknowledged as such. Scores .80 and higher indicate increasingly consistent relationships. Below, I calculate the consistency of the country-level variables (from the background sections) with the sets produced by FCA to develop hypotheses to explain the configuration of symbolic boundaries at the macro level.
THREE SYMBOLIC BOUNDARY CONFIGURATIONS
I identified three typical symbolic boundary configurations via FCA. 8 Table 7 describes the value of each boundary for Sets A, B, and C centered around the mean for all countries.
Set A is characterized by: (1) stronger than average racial and religious symbolic boundaries, (2) weaker than average cultural and linguistic symbolic boundaries, (3) slightly weaker than average educational symbolic boundaries, and (4) slightly stronger than average occupational symbolic boundaries. Set B is characterized by: (1) stronger than average linguistic and cultural symbolic boundaries, (2) weaker than average religious and racial symbolic boundaries, (3) slightly stronger than average educational symbolic boundaries, and (4) slightly weaker than average occupational symbolic boundaries. Set C is characterized by: (1) weaker than average scores on every symbolic boundary, (2) extremely weak racial symbolic boundaries, (3) extremely weak education and occupation symbolic boundaries, and (4) weaker than average religious symbolic boundaries (but slightly stronger than those in Set B). Figure 2 is a three-dimensional scatter-plot of each country's membership scores in Sets A, B,
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EXPLORING THE CONFIGURATIONS
Perhaps the most striking feature of Figure 2 is the geographic pattern of countries across the three sets. Countries that most closely resemble Set A (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, and Hungary) are each located on the periphery of Europe. Set B countries (Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Slovenia) are geographically continuous in the "core" of Western Europe-if one ignores the English Channel-and all but one of the Set C countries (Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) are part of Scandinavia. The inbetween countries roughly follow this pattern as well. Slovenia sits between the "core" countries of Set B and the "peripheral" countries of Set A. Ireland sits between Sets A and C, and the Netherlands sits between Sets B and C. Because a theory of boundary-work does not yet exist, a variety of different hypotheses could be developed to further explain the FCA results. Below I develop hypotheses by exploring the consistency of Sets A, B, and C with the four country-level factors discussed in the background sections: (1) the sources and timing of
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Figure 2. Fuzzy Membership Scores in Three Sets
Notes: A country's membership scores describe how closely its configuration of symbolic boundaries resembles the sets described in Table 7 . Countries with high membership in a given set are prototypical; those with low membership are simply atypical. Ellipses depict the "crisp" clustering solution: the major diameter or "length" describes the range of membership scores within each crisp cluster whereas the minor diameter or "width" describes overlap between them.
immigration, (2) the size and origin of immigrant groups and their position in the labor market, (3) citizenship and civic inclusion policies, and (4) philosophies of integration. Table 8 describes the consistency between Sets A, B, and C and the four fuzzy sets that describe increases in migration by decade proportional to the total population. Set C is highly consistent with countries that experienced high net migration between 1960 and 1970, 1980 and 1990, and 1990 to 2000 . Set B is highly consistent with high net migration between 1960 and 1970 and consistent with high net migration between 1980 and 1990. Although consistency increases between Set A and net migration by decade, it never reaches the .80 benchmark.
CONSISTENCY CALCULATIONS
Returning to Table 1 , one finds that the Set A countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, and Hungary) were all once countries of emigration and only recently experienced large-scale immigration. In contrast, the countries in Sets B and C all experienced sizeable postcolonial or guest worker migration in the decades after World War II.
Given the timing of migration, it is not surprising that Sets B and C are consistent with countries that have large immigrant populations (proportional to the total population), while Set A is not (see Table 8 ). Set B is consistent with countries that have large immigrant populations from the Middle East and North Africa, subSaharan Africa, South and East Asia, and Oceania. Set C is consistent with countries that have large immigrant populations from all regions except the Caribbean and Oceania. Set
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PHILOSOPHIES OF INTEGRATION IN CONTEXT
Surprisingly, the results suggest that official philosophies of integration do not correspond to the configuration of symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public. France, Britain, and Germany's philosophies of integration are compared in the literature more often than those of any other combination of countries (see Table  5 ). Figure 2 , however, suggests the configuration of symbolic boundaries used by the general public in these three countries is nearly identical. All three countries are closely affiliated with Set B, which is characterized by strong linguistic and cultural symbolic boundaries and weak racial and religious boundaries. While this configuration mirrors the emphasis on assimilation in French républicanisme, it runs counter to the pluralist tenets of British multicultural race relations. The results are even less compatible with Germany's historical emphasis on ancestry, despite a modest growth of assimilationist rhetoric in government discourse described in recent studies (Brubaker 2001; Carrera 2006) . Moreover, there is no discernable pattern across Sets A and C apart from the lack of philosophies of integration among most countries that resemble Set A.
DISCUSSION
SET A: NEW IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES ON THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY
Countries most closely affiliated with Set A (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, and Hungary) share the following characteristics: (1) They are located on the periphery of the European Union. (2) They were all once sources of emigration and only recently began receiving considerable immigration. Nevertheless, (3) immigrants remain a small proportion of the overall population. Therefore, (4) discourses about immigrant integration are relatively unsophisticated compared with those in the old immigration countries of Western and Northern Europe.
It remains to be determined why racial and religious symbolic boundaries are stronger than average in Set A (see Table 7 ). One hypothesis is that phenotype and religious dress provide visual cues about group membership that are particularly conspicuous in new immigration countries, precisely because of their homogeneity. These cues may limit positive contact between groups, allowing racial and religious stereotypes to go unchallenged (Allport 1958 ). An abrupt increase in the visibility of a minority population may also provoke perceptions of "group threat" (Blumer 1958) , as majority group members come to realize that certain privileges and status are attached to their race or religion. These perceptions may be reinforced by economic insecurity as well, and Set A is consistent with countries that experienced an influx of immigrants into their labor markets in recent years. 10 The results might also suggest that antiracist discourse has not yet permeated the periphery of Europe as thoroughly as it has Europe's core. Note that these hypotheses are not
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#3285-ASR 73:1 filename:73103-Bail page 54 10 This may also explain why occupational symbolic boundaries are stronger than average in Set A. See the Online Supplement for a more comprehensive application of "group threat" and "contact" theory following Quillian (1995) . mutually exclusive. For example, positive contact may limit perceptions of group threat or facilitate the diffusion of antiracist discourse. Nevertheless, additional research is needed to explore these hypotheses in different combinations and to provide alternative explanations for the strength of racial and religious symbolic boundaries in Set A countries.
SET B: OLD IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES IN THE CORE OF WESTERN EUROPE
Countries most closely affiliated with Set B (Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Slovenia) share the following characteristics: (1) They are located in the core of Western Europe (except Slovenia). (2) They received substantial immigration in the decades after World War I, either from guest worker agreements with countries on the European periphery (including Turkey and North Africa) or from former colonies. Because of this, (3) immigrants now constitute a sizeable portion of the overall population, and (4) public discourse about immigration has evolved over decades and is therefore more sophisticated than that of the new immigration countries.
The emphasis on language and culture in Set B countries may result from natives' acceptance of the permanency of immigration. As second generations of nonwhite and nonChristian immigrants come of age, racial and religious distinctions may not only become less conspicuous but also less politically tenable. While public discourse necessarily shifts from the accommodation to the integration of immigrant populations, natives may become more concerned about the longevity of their linguistic and cultural identity. Or, natives may realize that language and culture guarantee the privileges of group status that were previously "protected" by race or religion. These attitudes may be reinforced by recent reports of "segmented" or "downward" assimilation of second-generation immigrants (e.g., Alba 2005; Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007) , whose difficulty crossing social boundaries may inhibit their "symbolic" integration as well. There is growing controversy, for example, about "reactive ethnicity" among secondgeneration Turks in Germany (Diehl and Schnell 2006) and their North African counterparts in France (Beaud and Pialoux 2003) .
Regardless of the extent of second-generation disenchantment, the "integration question" is perceived as a common "social problem" across most Set B countries (e.g., Tissot 2007) . With the exception of Slovenia, Set B countries are long-standing participants in discussions about the harmonization of immigration policy at the EU level, and they are highly aware of each other's integration strategies (Carrera 2006) . 11 This may have produced convergence in the configuration of symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public, because these discussions are constrained within a universal human rights discourse that stigmatizes group-based exclusion but sanctions individual-level exclusion based on language, culture, and human capital (Joppke 2005) . Nevertheless, additional research is needed to explain why such supranational discourse appears to have permeated Set B countries more deeply than countries in Set A.
SET C: ACCOMMODATING ISOLATIONISTS
Countries most closely affiliated with Set C (Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) share the following characteristics: (1) They are located in Scandinavia (except Switzerland).
(2) They each received considerable migration after World War II, although they had no colonies from which to recruit. Because these countries initially had relatively small populations, (3) immigrants from a variety of different regions constitute a relatively large proportion of the overall population. Finally, (4) they are politically isolated from the core of Western Europe, and discourse about immigrant integration has evolved independently (Runbolm 1994; Wimmer 2002) .
As above, the weak racial and religious symbolic boundaries characteristic of Set C countries could be explained as resulting from strong antiracist discourse, positive contact among natives and non-European immigrants, or the absence of competition between them. None of these hypotheses, however, explain why racial linguistic and cultural symbolic boundaries are far weaker in Set C countries than in all others. Here, deeper historical analysis may be war-ranted. Tägil (1995) , for instance, shows that intergroup differences were accommodated in the early history of Scandinavian countries to provide stability against the threat of culturally homogenous rivals. This was also true of Switzerland, where geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual defense of the country) united disparate linguistic and religious groups into a single republic in the face of threats from its more powerful neighbors. 12 In contrast, linguistic and cultural differentiation was central to the nation-building strategies of many Set B countries. Consider, for example, the Herderian tradition in Germany (Calhoun 1993) or France's virulent "Anglophobia," which Britain repaid in kind (Greenfeld 1992) . Likewise, race and religion were particularly important distinctions in the nation-building strategies of several countries on the European periphery that defined themselves against the threat of non-European and nonChristian empires.
This line of reasoning builds on Gellner's (1983) theory of nationalism, which suggests that different components of group identity become salient based on threats from external groups. When "human chasms" such as race or religion do not separate insiders from outsiders, Gellner's theory predicts that linguistic and cultural boundaries become the primary mechanism of intergroup exclusion. While it is not clear whether European publics today are aware that such processes might affect their attitudes toward immigrants, the national self-understandings produced during nation building may be path dependent. As many Western European countries forced their language and culture on colonies, Scandinavian countries, for example, condemned them for doing so (Zølner 2000) and welcomed a disproportionate number of refugees from those colonies. 13 In this way, Gellner's theory is not incompatible with the other hypotheses developed above. For instance, historical emphasis on accommodating disparate groups may have encouraged positive contact between natives and immigrants or reduced perceptions of threat between them. Or the coincidence of these national self-understandings with international antiracist discourse may have rendered ethnocentric attitudes less politically tenable than elsewhere. Again, much additional research is needed to explore these hypotheses more rigorously.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
To be sure, the configuration of symbolic boundaries is but one of many factors that shape the integration of immigrants into host societies. While the socioeconomic and legal segregation of immigrants cannot be ignored, neither can the role of symbolic boundaries in creating and maintaining social boundaries. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to establish whether the configurations of symbolic boundaries revealed above are the product or the source of social inequality. While it is likely that causality works in both directions, longitudinal data and historical case studies are needed to explore my hypotheses in greater detail and in different combinations. In addition, ethnography and in-depth qualitative research are needed to further analyze the content of these symbolic boundaries across different situations. For example, it is possible that linguistic and cultural symbolic boundaries are used publicly to mask private racism or Islamophobia.
This study provides new theoretical and methodological tools for the study of boundarywork. I argue that treating immigrants as a single out-group neglects important cross-national variation in the conceptual distinctions used by natives to create notions of "us" and "them." The typology of symbolic boundaries presented above provides much needed context for previous comparisons of two or three Western European countries and identifies new variations in other regions of Europe. This discussion also identifies new historical, demographic, and socioeconomic variables that appear to be more promising in explaining the logic of boundarywork than the philosophies of integration emphasized in the literature. Together, these contributions constitute a preliminary step toward a theory of boundary-work that must be explored more rigorously by future studies in Europe and beyond. 
